Meetings: Tuesdays, 12:00-2:30, GY 341
Instructor: Randall D. Beer
Office: 840 Eigenmann
Phone: 856-0873
Email: rdbeer [AT] indiana [DOT] edu
Course Description
One increasingly hears about the enactive approach to cognition, but what is it and how does it relate to other approaches? The purpose of this seminar is to explore the ideas behind enaction and to evaluate their significance for cognitive science. Since the enactive approach is grounded in earlier work by Maturana and Varela on autopoiesis and the biology of cognition, the seminar will be divided roughly equally between understanding this earlier work and understanding how the enactive approach extends it. Through readings and discussion, we will examine the conceptual foundations of these ideas, computational models and experimental explorations of them, and their relation to sensorimotor contingencies, ecological and embodied approaches to cognition. Throughout the course, we will also incrementally develop and study a toy model that concretely engages all of the issues raised.
Grading
| 25% Paper Reactions |
| 25% Active Participation in Class Discussion |
| 50% Final Project/Paper |
Course Policies
Class Participation: All students are expected to attend and actively participate in every class. Lateness to class and unexcused absences will decrease the class participation grade. If you cannot attend a class due to illness, please notify me. If you need to miss a class for an interview or conference, please discuss this with me well in advance of the absence.
Paper Reactions: There will be background readings for each meeting. In order to focus the class discussion, you will be asked to turn in a 1-2 page written reaction to the readings for each meeting at the beginning of class. Note that this is not a synopsis; it should summarize your own thoughts on the readings and topics that you would like to discuss. The primary purpose of these paper reactions is to ensure that you carefully read the background papers and come to class with ideas and questions to discuss
Final Project/Paper: At the end of the semester, you will turn in a final project or paper on some topic related to the course. The goal of this final project/paper is to allow you to explore an area of enaction that you find particularly interesting in considerably more depth. This topic can be drawn from our discussions, from the more extensive bibliography below, or from your own readings. Around the middle of the semester, you will be asked to turn in a written proposal for your topic or paper for approval.
Syllabus
| Date | Section | Topic | Readings |
|---|---|---|---|
| 8/27/2019 | Introduction | What's It All About? (Lecture Slides) | Thompson, E. (2007). Excerpt from Mind in Life (Chapter 1). MIT Press. |
| 9/3/2019 | Biology of Cognition | Basic Notions (Lecture Slides) | Maturana, H.R. (1973/1980). Excerpt from Autopoiesis and Cognition (Introduction). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Maturana, H.R. (1988). Ontology of observing (read sections 1-6 only). Conference Workbook, American Society for Cybernetics Conference, Felton, CA. |
| 9/10/2019 | Biology of Cognition | Autopoiesis 1 (Lecture Slides) | Thompson, E. (2007). Excerpt from Mind in Life (Chapter 5). MIT Press. Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1973/1980). Excerpt from Autopoiesis and Cognition (read only pp. 73-95). D. Reidel. |
| 9/17/2019 | Biology of Cognition | Autopoiesis 2 (Lecture Slides) | Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1973/1980). Excerpt from Autopoiesis and Cognition (read only pp. 96-118). D. Reidel. Lyon, P. (2004). Autopoiesis and knowing: Reflections on Maturana's biogenic explanation of cognition. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 11(4):21-46. |
| 9/24/2019 | Biology of Cognition | Domain of Interactions (Lecture Slides) | Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1987). Excerpts from The Tree of Knowledge (pp. 74-75, 95-103). Shambhala. Maturana, H.R. and Varela, F.J. (1973/1980). Excerpt from Autopoiesis and Cognition (pp. 118-123). D. Reidel. |
| 10/1/2019 | Biology of Cognition | Structural Coupling (Lecture Slides) | Maturana, H.R. (2002). Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition: A history of these and other notions in the biology of cognition. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 9:5-34. Beer, R.D. (2019). Bittorio revisited: Structural coupling in the Game of Life. Adaptive Behavior. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/1059712319859907 |
| 10/8/2019 | Biology of Cognition | Operational Closure of the Nervous System | Varela, F.J. (1979). Excerpt from Principles of Biological Autonomy (Chapter 15). North Holland. Maturana, H.R. (1978).Biology of language: The epistemology of reality. In G.A. Miller, & E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought: Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg (pp. 27-63). Academic Press. |
| 10/15/2019 | "Original" Enaction | Autonomy and Organizational Closure | Varela, F.J. (1979). Excerpt from Principles of Biological Autonomy (Chapter 7). North Holland. Varela, F.J. (1981). Autonomy and autopoiesis. In G. Roth and H. Schwegler (Eds.), Self-Organizing Systems: An interdiciplinary approach (pp. 14-24). Campus Verlag. |
| 10/22/2019 | "Original" Enaction | Sense-Making | Varela, F.J. (1986). Laying down a path in walking. Cybernetic 2:6-15. Varela, F.J. (1988). Structural coupling and the origin of meaning in a simple cellular automata. In E.E. Sercarz, F. Celada, N.A. Mitchison, & T. Tada (Eds.), The Semiotics of Cellular Communication in the Immune System (pp. 151-161). Berlin: Springer Verlag. |
| 10/29/2019 | "Original" Enaction | Natural Purposes | Weber, A. & Varela, F.J. (2002). Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundation of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(2): 97-125. |
| 11/5/2019 | "New" Enaction | Autopoiesis+ | Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4(4): 429-452. Di Paolo, E. (2009). Extended life. Topoi 28:9-21. |
| 11/12/2019 | "New" Enaction | Agency | Di Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T. & Barandiaran, X.E. (2017). Excerpt from Sensorimotor Life: An Enactive Proposal (Chapter 5). Oxford University Press. |
| 11/19/2019 | "New" Enaction | Sensorimotor Agency | Di Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T. & Barandiaran, X.E. (2017). Excerpt from Sensorimotor Life: An Enactive Proposal (Chapter 6). Oxford University Press. |
| 11/24/2019 | No Class | Thanksgiving Break | |
| 12/3/2019 | "New" Enaction | Social Agency | Di Paolo, E.A., Cuffari, E.C. & De Jaegher, H. (2018). Excerpt from Linguistic Bodies: The Continuity Between Life and Language (Chapter 4). MIT Press. |
| 12/10/2019 | Enaction | Wrap-Up | Di Paolo, E.A. (2018). The enactive conception of life. In A. Newen, L. de Bruin, and S. Gallagher (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition (pp. 71-94). Oxford University Press. |
Bibliography
Agmon, E., Gates, A.J., and Beer, R.D. (2016). The structure of ontogenies in a model protocell. Artificial Life 22:499-517.Agmon, E., Gates, A.J., Churavy, V. and Beer, R.D. (2016). Exploring the space of viable configurations in a model of metabolism-boundary co-construction. Artificial Life 22:153-171.
Agmon, E., Glazier, J. and Beer, R.D. (2017). Structural coupling of a Potts model cell. In C. Knibbe et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of the European Conference on Artificial Life 2017 (pp. 13-20). MIT Press.
Barandiaran, X.E. (2017). Autonomy and enactivism: Towards a theory of sensorimotor autonomous agency. Topoi :409-430.
Barandiaran, X.E., Di Paolo, E. & Rohde, M. (2009). Defining agency: Individuality, normativity, asymmetry and spatio-temporality in action. Adaptive Behavior 17(5):367-386.
Barandiaran, X.E. & Egbert, M.D. (2014). Norm-establishing and norm-following in autonomous agency. Artificial Life 20(1):5-28.
Barandiaran, X. & Moreno, A. (2006). On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: A minimally cognitive organization program. Adaptive Behavior 14(2):171-185.
Barandiaran, X. & Moreno, A. (2008). Adaptivity: From metabolism to behavior. Adaptive Behavior 16(5):325-344.
Barrett, N.F. (2017). The normative turn in enactive theory: An examination of its roots and implications. Topoi 36:431-443.
Beer, R.D. (2004). Autopoiesis and cognition in the Game of Life. Artificial Life 10(3):309-326.
Beer, R.D. (2014). The cognitive domain of a glider in the Game of Life. Artificial Life 20(2):183-206.
Beer, R.D. (2015). Characterizing autopoiesis in the Game of Life. Artificial Life 21(1):1-19.
Beer, R.D. (2018). On the origin of gliders. In T. Ikegami et al. (Eds.), Proceedings of 2018 Conference on Artificial Life (pp. 67-74). MIT Press.
Beer, R.D. (2019). Bittorio revisited: Structural coupling in the Game of Life. Adaptive Behavior. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/1059712319859907
Bich, L. & Arnellos, A. (2012). Autopoiesis, autonomy, and organizational biology: Critical remarks on "Life after Ashby". Cybernetics and Human Knowing. 19(4):75-103.
Bourgine, P. & Stewart, J. (2004). Autopoiesis and cognition. Artificial Life 10(3):327-345.
Buhrmann, T., Di Paolo, E.A. & Barandiaran, X. (2013). A dynamical systems account of sensorimotor contingencies. Frontiers in Psychology 4:285, doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00285.
De Jaegher, H. & Di Paolo, E. (2007). Participatory sense-making: An enactive approach to social cognition. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6:485-507.
De Jaegher, H., Di Paolo, E. & Gallagher, S. (2010). Can social interaction constitute social cognition? Trends in Cognitive Sciences 14(10):441-447.
Di Paolo, E. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4(4): 429-452.
Di Paolo, E. (2009). Extended life. Topoi 28:9-21.
Di Paolo, E., Buhrmann, T. & Barandiaran, X.E. (2017). Sensorimotor Life: An Enactive Proposal. Oxford University Press.
Di Paolo, E.A., Cuffari, E.C. & De Jaegher, H. (2018). Linguistic Bodies: The Continuity Between Life and Language. MIT Press.
Egbert, M.D. & Di Paolo, E.A. (2009). Integrating behavior and autopoiesis: An exploration in computational chemo-ethology. Adaptive Behavior 17(5): 387-401.
Froese, T. (2010). From cybernetics to second-order cybernetics: A comparative analysis of their central ideas. Constructivist Foundations 5(2):75-85.
Froese, T. (2011). From second-order cybernetics to enactive cognitive science: Varela's turn from epistemology to phenomenology. Systems Research and Behavioral Science 28:631-645.
Froese, T. & Stewart, J. (2010). Life after Ashby: Ultrastability and the autopoietic foundations of biological autonomy. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 17(4):7-50.
Froese, T. & Taguchi, S. (2019). The problem of meaning in AI and robotics: Still with us after all these years. Philosophies 4(2):14.
Froese, T. & Ziemke, T. (2009). Enactive artificial intelligence: Investigating the systemic organization of life and mind. Artificial Intelligence 173(3-4): 466-500.
Harvey, M.I. (2015). Content in languaging: Why radical enactivism is incompatible with representational theories of language. Language Sciences 48:90-129.
Hutto, D.D. & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. MIT Press.
Jonas, H. (2001). The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology. Northwestern Unviversity Press.
Luisi, P.L. (2003). Autopoiesis: A review and a reappraisal. Naturwissenschaften 90:49-59.
Lyon, P. (2004). Autopoiesis and knowing: Reflections on Maturana's biogenic explanation of cognition. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 11(4):21-46.
Maturana, H.R. (1978). Biology of language: The epistemology of reality. In G.A. Miller, & E. Lenneberg (Eds.), Psychology and Biology of Language and Thought: Essays in Honor of Eric Lenneberg (pp. 27-63). Boston: Academic Press.
Maturana, H.R. (1987). Everything is said by an observer. In W.I. Thompson (Ed.), GAIA: A Way of Knowing (pp. 65-82). Lindisfame Press.
Maturana, H.R. (1988). Ontology of observing systems. Conference Workbook, American Society for Cybernetics Conference. Felton, CA.
Maturana, H.R. (2002). Autopoiesis, structural coupling and cognition: A history of these and other notions in the biology of cognition. Cybernetics and Human Knowing 9:5-34.
Maturana, H.R. (2012). Reflections on my collaboration with Francisco Varela. Constructivist Foundations 7:(3):155-164.
Maturuna, H.R. & Poerksen, B. (2011). From Being to Doing: The Origins of the Biology of Cognition (Second Edition). Carl-Auer.
Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J. (1973/1980). Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living. Dordrecht:D. Reidel.
Maturana, H.R. & Varela, F.J. (1987). The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding. Shambhala.
McMullin, B. (2004). Thirty years of computational autopoiesis: A review. Artificial Life 10(3): 277-295.
Meincke, A.S. (2019). Autopoiesis, biological autonomy, and the process view of life. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9:5.
Moreno, A. & Mossio, M. (2015). Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and Theoretical Enquiry. Springer.
Noe, A. (2006). Action in Perception. MIT Press.
O'Regan, J.K. & Noe, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24:939-1031.
Stewart, J., Gapenne, O. & Di Paolo, E.A., Eds. (2010). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press.
Thompson, E. (2004). Life and Mind: From autopoiesis to neurophenomenology. A tribute to Francisco Varela. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3:381-398.
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Thompson, E. & Stapleton, M. (2009). Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi 28:23-30.
Varela, F.J. (1979). Principles of Biological Autonomy. North Holland.
Varela, F.J. (1981). Describing the logic of the living: The adequacy and limitations of the idea of autopoiesis. In M.Zeleny (Ed.), Autopoeisis: A theory of the living organization (pp. 36-48). North-Holland.
Varela, F.J. (1981) Autonomy and autopoiesis. In G.Roth and H.Schwegler (Eds.), Self-Organizing Systems: An interdiciplinary approach (pp. 14-24). Campus Verlag.
Varela, F.J. (1986). Laying down a path in walking. Cybernetic 2:6-15.
Varela, F.J. (1988). Structural coupling and the origin of meaning in a simple cellular automata. In E.E. Sercarz, F. Celada, N.A. Mitchison, & T. Tada (Eds.), The Semiotics of Cellular Communication in the Immune System (pp. 151-161). Berlin: Springer Verlag.
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Varela, F.J., Thompson, E.T. & Rosch, E. (1991). The Embodied Mind. MIT Press.
Villalobos, M. & Razeto-Barry, P. (2019). Are living beings extended autopoietic systems? An embodied reply (with commentaries). Adaptive Behavior. Advance online publication. doi:10.1177/ 1059712318823723.
Villalobos, M. & Ward, D. (2014). Living systems: autonomy, autopoiesis, and enaction. Philosophy & Technology 28(2):225-239.
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Weber, A. & Varela, F.J. (2002). Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundation of biological individuality. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1(2): 97-125.